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its own stock to the public, 5 is a "dealer," 16 within the meaning of
the Martin Act was not answered by the court.'7 It should be noted,
however, that decisions under the Martin Act have generally tended
to favor the public.' 8 The decision in the instant case, explainable
on the grounds of statutory construction,19 is an apparent, rather than
a real deviation from this general policy. This policy, coupled with
an opinion handed down by the Attorney General,20 convinces the
writer that when this question is presented to the Court of Appeals,
it will probably be resolved in the affirmative.
B. B.
EVIDENCE-WIRE-TAPPING-STATUJTOPY CONSTRUCTION.-Peti-
tioners were convicted of smuggling alcohol largely upon evidence pro-
cured by the tapping of their telephone wires by federal officers. Such
tapping was done in the face of the Federal Communications Act '
which provided that "no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the contents
* * * of such intercepted communication to any person; * * *." On
appeal from a judgment affirming the conviction and approving the
admission of such evidence, held, reversed. The statute renders in-
'People v. Rutven, 160 Misc. '112, 288 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1936) (Held,
that the sale of stock by a corporation to its stockholders, who know that the
proceeds of such sale will be used for the purpose of continuing certain litiga-
tion, is not a sale to the public within the meaning of the Martin Act. By way
of dicta, it was also held that in the instant case the sale by the defendant
corporation was a sale to the public within the meaning of the Martin Act,
because it was willing to sell to anyone interested).
'IN. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (1928) art. 23A, §359e describes a dealer as
"** * every person, partnership, corporation, * * * who engages * * * in the
business of trading in securities in such a manner that as part of such business
any of such securities are sold or offered for sale to the public in this state;
* * *. The business of trading in securities * * * shall not include an isolated
transaction in which a specific security is sold or offered for sale * *
(Italics ours.)
" Instant case at p. 130.
'S Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423, 153 N. E. 298 (1926) (Upheld the
constitutionality of the Martin Act) ; In re Waldstein, 160 Misc. 763,
291 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1936). Held, that securities included any form of
instrument used for the purpose of financing and promoting enterprises. Cf.
People v. Federated Radio, 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926). Held, that
crimes are not created by implication, and the act does not expressly prohibit
fraudulent practices; the statute merely provides a procedure to prevent them.
See notes 12, 15, supra.
a' See note 9, supra.
Corporation marketing its own securities direct to the public is itself a
dealer under the definition contained in the Martin Act. REP. ATr'Y GEN.
(1925) 187.
148 STAT. at L. 1069, 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 605.
RECENT DECISIONS
admissible evidence obtained by wire-tapping, and federal officers are
within the purview of the Act. Nardone v. United States, - U. S.
-, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
The general rule at common law is that evidence procured il-
legally, if not otherwise incompetent, is admissible.2  Where no con-
stitutional rights are concerned, the rule is absolute.3 In the United
States there are exceptions at least in cases involving evidence pro-
cured and used in violation of the Fourth 4 and Fifth 5 Amendments
to the Constitution.
In the case of Olmstead v. United States 6 defendants were con-
victed of smuggling alcohol. The evidence upon which this convic-
tion was based was obtained through the tapping of telephone wires
by federal officers. In Washington, where the evidence was procured,
there was a statute making wire-tapping a misdemeanor.7 In that en-
actment, unlike the Federal Communications Act, above mentioned,
there was no provision as to the disposition of the information obtained
in violation of the Act. It was decided that the tapping of telephone
wires of suspected criminals, off their premises, was not violative of
the Fourth Amendment since there was no entry of the houses or
offices of the criminals, nor any unlawful search nor seizure.8 Neither,
it was held, was it repugnant to the Fifth Amendment, inasmuch as
the criminals were under no compulsion to engage in telephone con-
versations. 9 Therefore, in keeping with the general rule, admission of
evidence obtained through wire-tapping was declared proper, even
though it was a crime in the state in which it was done. At that time
no federal statute applied to such wire-tapping. The question in the
'Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904) ; People v.
Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903); 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) § 2183. The reason is one of expediency, it being felt that the courts
should not divert attention from principal issues by inquiring into incidental
matters. See People v. Adams, supra, at 358, 68 N. E. at 638 (1903).
:5 JONES, EVMENCE (2d ed. 1926) 2075, n.3.
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921); Amos v. United
States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 366 (1921) ; cf. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y.
13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926) (wherein it was held that evidence obtained in viola-
tion of Civil Rights Law § 8, substantially the same as the fourth amendment,
was admissible).
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
'277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
"Every person who shall intercept *** a message over any telephone or
telegraph line * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor". WAsH. CoMp. STAT.
(Remington, 1922) 2656-18.
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated **
U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV.
This was decided not without a vigorous dissent by four justices who took
exception to so rigid an interpretation of the amendment; cf. State v. Hester,
137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 (1926) (use of a dictaphone arrangement to obtain
evidence was not an unreasonable search or seizure).
'No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself ** *." U. S. CoNST. Art. V.
1938)
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instant case arose under the Federal Communications Act, which
changed the common law rule, 10 and the difficulty was as to whether
the officers of the Federal Government were within the prohibition of
the Act.
Though the rule is stated that general words in a statute do not
bind the sovereign enacting it, where its prerogatives are involved,"
there are exceptions.' 2 In this country the rule has been applied to
two classes of cases. The first is where the statute would inhibit the
exercise of an established sovereign power.'5  The second is where
application of the act would be inimical to public safety.1 4  The rule
seems to be less stringent when a statute operates upon the agents of,
rather than the sovereign itself.15
It is a principle of statutory construction that the sovereign is
included in acts directed against wrong and oppression.' 6 Inasmuch
It provides that there shall be no divulgence to any person of information
obtained. "To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is
to divulge the message". Instant case at 276.
It should be noted that the change is limited to evidence procured by such
wire-tapping as is within the scope of the act. Admissibility of evidence pro-
cured in violation of other laws is unaffected.
'1 BL. CoMM. *262; 1 KENT. COMM. *460; BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF
LAws (1896) §54.
'In the Magdalen College Case (11 Co. [K. B.] 66b, 77 Eng. Reprints
1235), one of the earliest cases upholding the rule, were stated three exceptions.
They were said to exist when the statute was passed for eleemosynary, religious
or educational purposes (71b) ; or where it was designed for the suppression of
wrong (72a) ; or where the will of a founder or donor would otherwise be
rendered ineffectual (73a).
As to the applicability of statutes to the sovereign where prerogatives are
conferred, rather than abridged, see BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 54;
also Perry v. Eames, 8 App. Cases 360 (1883).
" Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 22 L. ed. 80 (U. S.
1874) (a statute prescribing, and thereby limiting remedies did not apply to the
government in a suit to collect taxes) ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251,
22 L. ed. 275 (1874) (debts due the United States were not barred by a debtor's
discharge in bankruptcy). See comprehensive collation of cases in 22 L. ed.
385, 386.
" Farley v. New York, 152 N. Y. 222, 46 N. E. 506 (1897) (a statute setting
a speed limit of five miles an hour would not be applied to fire apparatus going
to a fire) ; State v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103 Atl. 962 (1918) (military opera-
tions, in time of war, exempt from motor vehicle laws) ; Washington v. Gor-
ham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 Pac. 457 (1920) (sheriff, in line of duty, exempt from
speed limitations).
"United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174, 55 Sup. Ct. 666 (1935).
" BLAcK, INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 54; "* * * the King shall not be
exempted by construction of law out of the general words of acts made to
suppress wrong, because he is the fountain of justice and common right, and
the King being God's lieutenant cannot do a wrong, Solum Rex hoc non potest
facere, quod non potest iniuste agere: * * *." Lord Coke, in the Magdalen
College Case. 11 Co. [K. B.] 66b, 72a (1615).
[ VorL. 12
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as wire-tapping has long been regarded as a reprehensible practice, 17
the principle, in this case, seems to have been justly applied.' 8
A.W.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-TRUSTS-DOWER-DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW SECTION 18 CONSTRUED.-Ferdinand Straus, three days prior
to his death on July 1, 1934, after making his last will, executed a
trust agreement wherein he transferred to trustees all his real and
personal property, reserving the income for life, right to revoke the
trust at will, and full control of the trustees. Upon his death, the
property was to pass to one other than his wife.' The widow has
challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees. Held, the hus-
band's conveyance to the trustees, reserving the income, power of
revocation and right to control the trustees was illusory and void as
to the rights of the surviving spouse under the Decedent Estate Law
Sections 18 and 83.2 Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d)
966 (1937).
Prior to September 1, 1930, a wife was endowed of a life estate
in one-third of the real property of which her deceased husband was
beneficially seized during coverture.3 While the husband was still
alive, dower was an inchoate right, a mere contingent claim and not
an estate in land, 4 yet, it was a subsisting interest which was fully
"See N. Y. Times, Edit., Sept. 4, 1931, p. 18, col. 3; id. Dec. 3, 1932, p.
36, col. 6; id. Edit., Jan. 30, 1933, p. 2, col. 4.
"As to effect upon intrastate communications, see Edit., N. Y. L. J.,
Dec. 29, 1937.
'The deceased could not have effectively cut off his wife by a testamentary
disposition, nor by dying intestate seized of the property in question. If the
agreement effectively divested the settlor of title, then the decedent left no estate
and the widow receives nothing.
I N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 18. "Where a testator dies after August 31, 1930,
and leaves a will thereafter executed and leaves surviving a husband or wife, a
personal right of election is given to the surviving spouse to take his or her
share of the estate as in intestacy, subject to the limitations, conditions and
exceptions contained in this section. ** *." See also DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
§§82, 83.
'N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 190. "When the parties intermarried prior to
the first day of September, 1930, a widow shall be endowed of the third part
of all lands whereof her husband was prior to the first day of September, 1930,
seized of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage. Except as
hereinbefore provided, after the 31st day of August, 1930, no inchoate right of
dower shall be possessed by a wife during coverture, and no widow shall be
endowed in any lands whereof her husband became seized of an estate of
inheritance."
'Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 11 N. E. 649 (1887); Moore v. City
of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 110 (1853).
1938 ]
